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The collective of autonomous cars is expected to generate almost optimal traffic. In this position
paper we discuss the multi-agent models and the verification results of the collective behaviour of
autonomous cars. We argue that non-cooperative autonomous adaptation cannot guarantee optimal
behaviour. The conjecture is that intention aware adaptation with a constraint on simultaneous de-
cision making has the potential to avoid unwanted behaviour. The online routing game model is
expected to be the basis to formally prove this conjecture.
1 Introduction
Autonomous cars open new possibilities and offer several benefits. These benefits include: increased
mobility of the elderly and disabled people; better utilisation of travel time; finding urban places faster;
more efficient traffic flow; less congestion; increased fuel efficiency. The last three benefits imply that
the collective behaviour of autonomous cars will be close to a kind of optimum on the collective level.
We are going to discuss the formal verification of this promise. Because we the verification is aimed at
proving the properties of the collective behaviour of decentralised autonomous entities, the formal proofs
are somewhat different from classical formal verification methods.
Autonomous cars detect their environment using different sensors like radar, LIDAR, GPS, computer
vision, digital map, real-time traffic information and shared information. The planning unit of the au-
tonomous car merges and interprets this sensory information to determine the necessary control actions
to navigate the car to its destination and to avoid obstacles. As long as we focus on a single autonomous
car, we can say that the planning unit executes centralised adaptation, because there is only one actor
that senses the environment and takes actions to adapt to the changing environment. However if the road
network is populated by several autonomous cars, then the overall traffic will emerge as the result of the
collective behaviour of several autonomous cars. If there are several actors that sense the environment
and take autonomous actions, then it is decentralized adaptation. If autonomous cars are designed with
only centralized adaptation in focus, then they may be able to avoid obstacles and navigate to their desti-
nation, but if they meet other autonomous cars, then their joint actions may generate unwanted behaviour
in some situations.
The human driven vehicle population may also bring about unwanted behaviour sometimes, but the
issue will be more critical in the case of autonomous cars, because of two major differences between
human driven and autonomous cars. One difference is that human drivers may be psychologically influ-
enced, while autonomous cars always make rational decisions. Human drivers may follow their habits,
although these habits may not be optimal and these habits may be unwanted for the overall traffic. The
psychologically influenced decision of human drivers may sometimes result in preferable altruistic be-
haviour, but sometimes it may result in unwanted panic-like behaviour. On the contrary, autonomous cars
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always follow their designed rational preferences. The other difference is that human drivers may not
always be aware of the relevant information, while autonomous cars always make informed decisions.
Although humans are better in many cognitive tasks than machines, the machines have wider sensory
capabilities than humans. Machines can use telecommunication technologies to ”see” beyond objects
(e.g. the approaching car behind the corner) and to ”see” much farther away (e.g. congestion along
the planned route on the other side of the city). As more and more information services are deployed
to provide real-time traffic information to traffic participants, autonomous cars will have real-time and
more precise information than humans. On the other hand, informed decision raises the issue of security
and dependence on technology. Information might be provided by malicious sources, or the data may
not be reliable or accurate. Up-to-date information is a critical issue according to a recent study [10], but
we presume that autonomous cars will receive exact enough real-time data.
The verification of centralised adaptation is necessary to ensure that autonomous cars can safely move
on the street. Verification of decentralised adaptation is complementary to the verification of centralised
adaptation, and it makes sure that the collective of autonomous cars do not produce unwanted behaviour,
like for example inefficient usage of the road infrastructure.
In Section 2 we overview the main non-cooperative game theory models of decentralised adaptation
and we highlight the main conclusions of the verification results from these models. In Section 3 we
discuss methods that improve the properties of decentralised adaptive systems, we present their models,
and we highlight the main conclusions of the verification results from these models. In Section 4 we
conclude the paper with the conjecture that unwanted behaviour in decentralised adaptation could be
avoided with the help of intention aware predictions, however this needs further research, which is among
the goals of the investigations within the EFOP-3.6.3-VEKOP-16 project in connection with the RECAR
[14] project.
2 Non-cooperative Decentralised Autonomous Adaptation
The basic characteristic of decentralised autonomous adaptation is that there are several autonomous
actors, called agents, which make decisions on which action to perform. The execution of the action of
an agent uses limited resources, which are shared by several agents. The more agents use a resource, the
less the agents prefer to use that resource. This is usually modelled with a cost function of the resource.
The result of the action of an agent depends not only on its own action, but also on the action of all the
other agents in its environment, because other agents may decide autonomously to use the same resource.
An agent may not know which actions the other agents intend to do, therefore an agent may be uncertain
which is the best action to perform.
The decentralised decision making of the autonomous agents is the subject of multi-agent research
[27]. The current belief [15] is that the best model of multi-agent decision making is founded in game
theory [18]. In accordance with game theory [13], the agents prefer some states of the environment to
other states of the environment, which is modelled with a utility function. If the agents do not cooperate,
then the rational agent selects that action which has the highest value among the worst possible utility of
the outcomes of its own action and the actions of other agents. The actions of the agents are in equilibrium
if no agent can benefit by changing its action while the other agents keep their actions unchanged. The
efficiency of the multi-agent system can be measured as a combination of the utilities of all of the agents.
A simple efficiency measure is the sum of the utilities of all the agents. The multi-agent system is optimal
if the sum of the utilities is maximal. Non-cooperative decentralized autonomous decision making may
not lead to optimal result. This inefficiency is measured with the price of anarchy which is the ratio
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Figure 1: A simple minority game like situation
between efficiency measure of the equilibrium and the optimum.
Game theory verified that the price of anarchy has an upper limit in some routing problems. The
routing problem is a network with source routing, where end users simultaneously choose a full route to
their destination and the traffic is routed in a congestion sensitive manner. If the cost functions are linear
functions of the traffic flow, then the price of anarchy is at most 4÷3 [16], i.e. this is how bad the overall
traffic is when decentralised autonomous decision making is applied by the traffic flow.
There are games with many equilibria. In this case, if there is no coordination, then agents do not
know which equilibrium is the goal of the collective and they may not select the right action. There are
games where the equilibrium is not symmetric, i.e. some of the agents are not happy with the equilibrium,
like in minority games [4]. In a minority game, the agents choose one of two choices independently, and
the agents who end up on the minority side win. If every agent deterministically chooses the same action,
then every agent is guaranteed to fail. The solution to this problem in game theory is to permit each agent
to use a mixed strategy, where a choice is made with a particular probability. This may be good to model
the macroscopic properties of diverse human behaviour, but random actionmust not be allowed to control
autonomous cars in situations like for example on Figure 1. Cars B andC are parked. The road is narrow
and only one of the autonomous cars A and D can pass at a time. If both decide to go first (programmed
randomly or deterministically), then they block each other. If both decide to wait for the other, then the
collective of cars A and D end up in a deadlock.
Classic game theory is concerned with the equilibrium, like traffic engineers who assume that the
traffic is always assigned in accordance with the equilibrium [25] [1]. They assume that all agents have
complete knowledge about the game, and the agents come to the equilibrium with full rationality. This
is not realistic, especially if agents do not cooperate and they have to make different actions depending
on the actions of the others, because there are several equilibria. Therefore game theory investigated
the evolutionary dynamics where the agents receive feedback by observing their own and other agents’
actions and utility, and change their own actions based on these observations. It is verified that with this
feedback assumption, the above mentioned routing game converges to the equilibrium [17] [9]. Another
type of feedback is used in regret minimisation, where agents compare their actually experienced utility
with the best possible utility in retrospect. It is verified that if the agents of the above routing game select
actions to minimize their regret, then their behaviour will converge to the equilibrium [2]. However the
investigations of these game dynamics have the following assumptions: the decision making is on the
flow level; the game is repeated; and the decision is based on experiences from the previous games. This
is not realistic in autonomous cars, where the decision making is done at the individual car level, and the
decision is based on the real-time situation instead of previous experiences. Nowadays more and more
services provide real-time information about the overall traffic situation.
If we want to model that each subsequent agent of the traffic flow may select different route, depend-
ing on the current traffic situation, then the above game theory models cannot be used. Autonomous cars
continuously enter the road network, and each agent of the traffic flow decides its optimal route when it
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enters the road network, and the decision is based on the real-time information about the status of the road
network. The outcome travel time for a given agent depends not only on the current characteristic of the
network and the route choice of all the agents simultaneously entering the road network, but also on the
trip schedule of other agents that have entered the network previously, enter the network simultaneously,
or will enter the network later.
The online routing game model (developed in [22], and later refined in [20]) models this case when
each autonomous car may select different route, based on real-time traffic information. In order to
measure the efficiency of real-time data usage, the benefit of online real-time data concept was defined
in [22]. The benefit of online real-time data is the ratio between the travel time with real-time data based
planning and the travel time without real-time data based planning. The agents are happy with real-time
data, if the benefit value is below 1. Three types (worst/average/best) of benefit of online real-time data
are needed in case an equilibrium traffic distribution cannot be achieved. It is proved in [22], that if the
agents try to maximise their utility, then the following properties are true: equilibrium is not guaranteed;
”single flow intensification” is possible; and the worst case benefit value of online real-time data is not
guaranteed to be below 1. Equilibrium may not be reached, because the traffic may fluctuate. ”Single
flow intensification” happens when vehicles entering the road network later may select alternative faster
routes, and they may catch up with the vehicles already on the road, and this way they cause congestion.
All-in-all, sometimes the traffic may produce strange behaviour [21] and the collective of agents may be
worse off by exploiting real-time information than without exploiting real-time information.
The above results from the verification with the online routing gamemodel indicates, that equilibrium
cannot be verified if the agents autonomously follow their preferences to adapt to their environment.
This is in line with experiments as well. For example the media supplement of [12] demonstrates that
a small disturbance may bring about the fluctuation of the traffic and serious traffic jams are formed,
if the agents apply non-cooperative decentralised adaptation. A specific algorithm can eliminate this
effect if an autonomous car can proactively force speed on others [19]. However in this experiment the
autonomous car plays the role of a kind of central controller.
We can conclude from the above models, proofs and verification results, that non-cooperative decen-
tralised autonomous adaptation to real-time data cannot guarantee to avoid unwanted behaviours of the
collective of autonomous cars. The optimal traffic flow is not guaranteed, and an equilibrium traffic flow,
which is worse than the optimal, is not guaranteed either.
3 Improved Decentralised Autonomous Adaptation
Some form of cooperation should be built into autonomous cars to improve their collective behaviour.
Cooperation is not only information exchange, but also coordinated actions within an agent commu-
nity, which means that an agent’s behaviour is influenced by the intentions and results of other agents.
Cooperation proved to be useful in other application areas as well [7].
There are several ways to coordinate the actions of agents. One way is to centralise the multi-
agent system and assign a control authority above the agents. For autonomous cars this would mean
for example that each geographical territory would be under the control of a control authority. When an
autonomous car reaches such territory, then it checks in at the control authority, and after the check-in,
the control authority would tell the autonomous car the exact route to follow to its destination. This is
somewhat similar to the operation of airports and how airplanes move in the area of the airport. The con-
trol authority is centralised, therefore it can be verified with verification methods of centralised systems.
In this control authority approach the autonomous car becomes something similar to a remote controlled
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car. The users of autonomous cars may not accept this concept, especially if the commands of the central
authority are not in line with the personal preferences and the individual has to suffer major drawback
to facilitate the collective benefit. The central control authority is a reliability risk and a performance
bottleneck as well.
If the idea of the central control authority is given up, then another approach with some autonomy
is when the coordination and communication is fostered by some kind of central service, but the control
remains at the agents. The agents do not communicate directly with each other, but they communicate
their intentions with the central service. The central service aggregates data about the agent collective
and sends feedback to the agents [5]. The intention aware [26] and intention propagation [6] approaches
are based on this scheme. When an agent has made a decision on its planned route, then it sends its
selected intention to the central service. The central service is able to make a forecast of the future traffic
situation based on the current traffic state and the communicated intentions of the agents. The central
service provides the traffic forecast back to those agents who are still planning their trips, and these agents
use this information to plan their trip, and when they have made a decision, then they also communicate
their intentions to the central service. In theory, the online navigation software like Google Maps and
Waze (Figure 2) know the intentions of the agents and could use this information to make predictions.
Figure 2: A service from the Google
Play Store with prediction potential
The online routing game model was used to formally verify if
the prediction power of the central service can solve the problem
of avoiding unwanted behaviours of the collective of autonomous
cars. The verification results [20] show that there is no guaran-
tee on the value of the worst case benefit of online data and there
is no guarantee on the equilibrium, i.e. the traffic may fluctu-
ate. This means that if the agents selfishly exploit intention aware
prediction, then in some networks and in some cases the traffic
may be worse off by exploiting real-time information and predic-
tion than without. This is due to the fact that the central service
cannot take into account the decisions of those agents that make
decisions simultaneously, and the decisions may depend on each
other. However, it is verified [23] that in a small but complex
enough network, where there is only one traffic flow and there-
fore the agents that follow each other do not make decisions at
the same time, then there is a guarantee on the value of the worst
case benefit of online real-time data with prediction. In this case
the agents might just slightly be worse off with real-time data and
prediction in some cases. This verification result shows, that in the
network of [23], the intention aware prediction establishes enough
coordination among the agents. Currently the conjecture is that if simultaneous decision making among
the agents is prevented, then intention aware prediction can limit the fluctuation in the multi-agent sys-
tem [24] and the traffic converges to the equilibrium in bigger networks as well. This conjecture is an
important challenge for the verification of the collective behaviour of autonomous cars.
A critical issue of intention aware prediction is the trust in the intention submissions. If agents can
profit from misleading other agents with revealing false intention, then they might be tempted to exploit
this. In case of autonomous cars, the intention submission is done by the software built into the car. Car
manufacturers will have to certify that their software submits its intention truthfully and correctly, and
the software cannot be modified.
If the idea of a central coordination service is given up, then the agents have to coordinate their activ-
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ities on a peer-to-peer basis. Two possible approaches are coalition formation and gossiping. Coalition
formation may improve the behaviour of the agent collective, however if an agent can benefit from break-
ing the coalition agreement, then an authority is needed to make sure that the coalition agreement is kept
by the agents. The modelling and verification of coalition formation of autonomous cars can be founded
in cooperative game theory [3]. Gossiping may be a means for spreading information [8] or aggregating
information [11], however it is up to the agents how they use this information. The most likely usage
is to predict future traffic situation as in the case of intention awareness, but gossiping does not need a
central service. As we have seen, the guaranteed benefits of the prediction of future traffic situation has
not yet been verified.
We can conclude from the above discussion, that cooperation techniques based on intention aware-
ness have been proposed, but the verification of the preferred collective behaviour of the agents is still a
challenge.
4 Conclusion
One of the main promises of autonomous cars is that they produce better and closer to optimum collec-
tive behaviour than human drivers do. Each member agent of the collective of autonomous cars tries
to adapt to the changing environment, therefore they execute decentralised autonomous adaptation. The
verification of the preferred decentralised autonomous adaptation is important, because the collective
of agents may produce unwanted behaviour, especially if they exploit real-time information about the
whole collective. We have discussed models of collective agent behaviour, and discussed the verification
results from these models. In this position paper, we argued that guaranteeing the avoidance of unwanted
collective behaviour of non-cooperative agent collectives cannot be verified. Improved decentralised
autonomous adaptation techniques try to establish some kind of cooperation among the agents, mainly
through intention awareness. We have discussed models and verification results of intention aware col-
lective agent behaviour. The verification process started recently, and the verification results from these
models show that intention awareness improves the collective behaviour, but simultaneous decision mak-
ing may still cause problems. The aggregation of intentions to predict future traffic state needs further
research, too. We argued that these are critical issues, because if the wanted behaviour cannot be verified,
than the only viable approach to ensure the close to optimum behaviour of the collective of autonomous
agents is centralised control. We aim to discuss this at the workshop and investigate this issue in a future
project.
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